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How Does the State Restore Order During Crisis? Lessons from the UK’s Response to the 
“Riots” Of August 2011 
Abstract 
We use Speech Act Theory to study the UK state’s response to large-scale public disorder across 
English cities in August 2011. This historical case has practical implications for understanding 
how nation states address other crises - because we explain in detail how the discourse of 
powerful state actors restores order. Drawing on parliamentary debate, Select Committee 
testimony, and interviews with police officers, our contribution is to describe and analyse how 
this happened contemporaneously at different levels. At street level, this involved the reassertion 
of sovereignty through territorial struggles by the police. At what we call “state level”, Speech 
Act theory helps us to show how Members of Parliament framed the disorder and participants in 
ways that supported the re-establishment of norms and of order; principally through 
homogenization, in a process we describe as “tidying”.  
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Introduction 
During August 2011, protests following the police’s fatal shooting of Mark Duggan, a black 
resident of Tottenham, became a flashpoint for four days of large scale disorder (6th to 9th) 
across several English cities (principally, London, Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, Liverpool 
and Nottingham). Disorder spread via mainstream media and messaging services, both of which 
propagated a perception of the police as temporarily powerless. The scale of this set of events 
was remarkable. A year later, by August 10th of 2012, a total of 3,103 people had appeared in 
court for offences related to the disorder (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
Despite the widescale and shocking nature of this crisis, what became known as “the riots” did 
not lead to social change of the kind that people originally protesting about Mark Duggan’s 
killing wanted. This case has great resonance now because, on a transnational scale, events 
relating to the Black Lives Matter movement are still unfolding. Rather than comment on these 
directly here - which it is always difficult to do in academic research that is carried out mid-crisis 
- in this paper we analyse this historical case in depth. In doing so we explain why large-scale 
disorder failed to lead to social change. We explain this in terms of the UK state’s ability to 
mobilise a countervailing force to crisis: the “production of order”. In doing so we detail 
mechanisms and practices the state used to resist change. This contributes to a long standing 
conversation in The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences (JABS) on social change (Alvord, 
Brown & Letts, 2004; Easley, 2010; Sharma & Good, 2013; Waddell, 2016), and more 
specifically on the role of discourse in such change (Barrett, Thomas & Hocevar, 1995; Grant & 
Marshak, 2011; Oswick, Grant & Marshak, 2010). Writing on such controversial topics, we also 
aim to share with readers a “provocative manuscript” (Schwarz, 2020: 7) that we feel is in 
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keeping with strong traditions of JABS. Accordingly, we are not simply diagnosing and 
explaining change, but also responding to the recent call for papers that are themselves 
“initiating change” (Schwarz, 2020). 
Context 
There remains considerable debate surrounding the nature and causes of the 2011 “riots” (see, 
for example, Britain, 2012a,b,c; Dodd & Davies, 2011; Hope, 2012; Lewis, Newburn et al, 
2011). The aim of this paper is to consider a much more particular aspect to this crisis - the 
contemporaneous response of the state, which we understand in terms of production of order. 
This took place at two levels: at street level - in terms of the actions of the police, and at what we 
call “state level” - in a day of exceptional Parliamentary debate. In common with other scholars 
who have studied rioting, we understand street-level practices in terms of asserting sovereignty 
through territorial struggle (Wahlström, 2010). We make an original contribution here by 
additionally drawing on Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1955; Gregson & Rose, 2000; Miller, 2000; 
Rajagopalan, 2000; Searle, 1969, 1973, 1976) to identify and analyse discursive processes that 
helped Members of Parliament (MPs) re-assert or “produce” order. 
During the “riots”, across many English cities, thousands of citizens participated in public 
disorder on a massive scale. Many used the latest technology to support remote co-ordination, to 
out-manoeuvre police; and to prosecute tactics and purposes antithetical to order - such as arson 
and looting, and violence against the police and emergency services. This action, though large-
scale and ostensibly iconoclastic was fragmentary - with no obvious common purpose or 
prospect of pressing claims, and it took different forms at different times in different locations 
(Britain, 2012a). It was also fleeting - in the sense that it unfolded over a very short timescale 
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and in the sense that actions were often co-ordinated through instant messaging technology. It 
rapidly gave way to the restoration of order and thus large scale change was resisted. As we 
explain, this happened on two levels – first because to re-appropriate space on behalf of the state, 
the police engaged in territorial struggles and the reassertion of state sovereignty. Second, shortly 
after these territorial struggles, there was a state-level narration of order. This took place through 
the medium of “Speech Acts” – where MPs’ discourse framed the “riots” in ways that supported 
the restoration of order. Of particular interest in the UK case is a specific institutional mechanism 
amplifying the power of MPs’ discourse: Parliamentary debate. This took place on the 11 August 
2011, when MPs and the House of Commons was recalled from recess to debate the disorder. 
The day’s events (the Prime Minister’s statement and the subsequent day’s debate) were 
analysed contemporaneously by the lead author as part of a broader project on public order 
policing (references anonymised for peer review). Later, over a longer period, transcripts of the 
day were analysed by the authors - approximately 70,000 words of text (accessible via 
www.parliament.uk). The focus was to see how MPs’ contributions helped to “produce order”. 
The authors also retrospectively analysed contemporaneous media accounts of the disorder, 
subsequent Select Committee reports, and the response by the government (Britain, 2012a,b,c), 
as well as the report by the Metropolitan Police (2012) 4 Days in August. For additional 
contextualization we draw lightly on 38 interviews with police officers, on the topic of public 
order, that were recorded and transcribed and that varied in length from a few minutes during a 
break in a training exercise, to just over two hours. Beginning with a review of what we mean by 
the production of order, we describe the context to the UK disorder of August 2011 before 
analysing the state’s response. To account for the constitutive force of discourse in MPs’ 
production of order, we use Speech Act Theory. 
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Speech Act Theory is a suitable framework because it anchors effects (here - the production of 
order by MPs) to utterances (what was actually said in MPs’ contributions). We stay faithful to 
key aspects of the original version of Speech Act Theory, concentrating on the work of Austin 
(1955) and Searle (1973, 1976). So, we focus on the performative nature of language, and a 
concern with locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions. The linkage between 
discursive utterances and effects is the central concern of a broader literature on performativity 
inspired by Butler (1993, 1997) (Cabantous, Gond, Harding & Learmonth, 2016; Learmonth, et 
al. 2016). 
In applying Speech Act Theory to understand crisis and social change we connect with a stream 
of literature that otherwise challenges the “monologism” (Linell & Markova, 1993) of Speech 
Act Theory. Some critics have suggested that Speech Act Theory has its roots in individualist, 
Cartesian philosophy and is therefore decontextualized (Pratt, 1986). By firmly connecting to a 
social context we respond to such critics and we also join a rich seam of literature in JABS on 
discourse and change (Barrett, Thomas & Hocevar, 1995; Grant & Marshak, 2011; Oswick, 
Grant & Marshak, 2010). In keeping with this work in JABS we develop a pragmatic, context-
sensitive illustration of Austin’s core message: that words themselves “do” things that can have 
significant ideological and material effects. We begin by explaining how the state produces 
order. 
The production of order  
Human geographers teach us that civic spaces – of the kind that riots disturb and throw into 
turmoil - are physical and material, but at the same time their physicality and materiality need to 
be understood as a product of history, as a consequence of social norms, practices and routines 
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(Massey, 1994). Across society as a whole, civic order is underpinned by a shared sense of what 
civic space means (Lefebvre, 1991: 33; 2002a: 204; 2002b: xxiv; 2002c: 76). This is a key idea 
within the "spatial turn" (Green, Follert et al, 2010; Warf & Arias, 2008; Withers, 2009) across 
many disciplines (Banerjee, 2003; Wahlström, 2010).  
The production of order involves processes of commensuration and homogenization. These bring 
about a loss of the sense of space as created by nature, and a shift in its meaning into something 
that is an object owned by the state or its citizens (Banerjee, 2003). The way space (as it is 
created by nature) becomes something that can be “owned”, is a gradual colonization:, “the 
forces of history smashed naturalness forever” (Lefebvre, 1991: 49). At times, Lefebvre (the pre-
eminent theorist of space and order) frames this in terms of the everyday (Lefebvre, 2002 a,b,c), 
at times it can be understood in broader currents in his thought on urbanization (Lefebvre, 2003), 
European philosophy or political economy. We extend Lefebre’s account by showing how, 
during crisis, the state uses these same forces of commensuration and homogenization to 
“produce order” almost in real time. 
Lefebvre’s thinking is sometimes summarised in terms of the conceptual triad of space 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 33). Acknowledging that this is a simplification of his work, the triad describes: 
(1) spatial practice or “perceived space” - the characteristic practices of different social 
formations; (2) representations of space or “conceived space” - plans, maps, signs, codes; and (3) 
representational spaces or “lived space” - symbolic and local, or cultural, interpretations of 
space. An analogy for the relationship between these elements is they are a dialectic, but with 
three poles. This is without the synthesis between antinomies that features in Hegel (Lefebvre, 
1991: 39-41); but closer to a Nietzschean dialectic, “a convoluted dance of eternal opposition... 
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punctuated by rapprochement and subversion... distanced though simultaneously intertwined and 
perpetually in flux” (Morrell, 2012: 469). Each element needs to be understood in relation to the 
other, and as descriptors of process that are inevitably only partially accurate. Space is 
continually becoming, or emergent, rather than, say, at one time definitively “representation”, 
then at another time a different, fixed category that is “representational”. Nor is it dependent at 
any particular time on one form of practice.  
Representations of space establish privilege, normalize difference, support processes of 
homogenization, and perpetuate and flatten inequalities (Lefebvre, 1976). In short they produce 
order. For example, order is produced by large-scale activity - urban design for instance 
(Gottdiener, 2000), and by representations of activity – such as traffic signs or workflow 
diagrams and aspects of the built environment (Clegg & Kornberger, 2006). Laws and different 
kinds of logic or discourse also create boundaries and order and these boundaries can be both 
physical and concrete as well as metaphoric and abstract (Harvey, 1993). These can also play a 
part in sustaining order through local assertions of identity (Tyler & Cohen, 2010). Whether at a 
large or small scale, “(social) space is a (social) product” (Lefebvre, 1991: 26). Order influences 
action, but it is also the consequence of previous actions. 
The state can create order by making gulfs in power appear natural and unquestioned, creating 
boundaries that entrench power relations (Wählstrom, 2008). These can take effect through the 
influence of institutions, laws and social conventions, that are in turn constituted by norms 
(Lefebvre, 1976). The purpose of these is to give social space the impression of homogeneity, 
and support “state effects” that underpin order such as control and intervention (Painter, 2006). 
Such effects can be seen in the everyday geography, contours and demarcations of the high street 
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– ordered in ways designed to support consumption. The boundaries of an office complex, pit or 
factory, can be understood analogously (physical, but reinforced by abstract boundaries in law 
and routines or convention and norms). These boundaries normalise differences between public 
and private space. They make ownership of such spaces seem normal and in this way they 
support the status quo – again, “producing” order.  
When we apply this to think about civic disorder – such as riots – this perspective shows how 
riots often involve a change in what space means. Ordinarily, representations of space are given 
by the state and serve to homogenize and normalise, thereby sustaining order (Lefebvre, 1976, 
1991). But during riots there can be a shocking resistance to these state representations of space 
as various “counter-projects” break with homogeneity. Certain spaces can become “out of 
bounds” or “no go areas” for example. Barricades can separate what spaces the state still owns 
from spaces that have become occupied by rioters. Arson can change the meaning of space 
dramatically as fires replace artificial light. Wide-scale looting is a flagrant breach of social 
conventions and laws. 
All these and more happened during the large-scale disorder of August 2011, and this meant the 
state had to produce order quickly: to restore a sense of normality whilst also reasserting 
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction (Agnew, 1994). Necessarily and evidently this involved 
street-level practices by state representatives such as the police and emergency services 
(Wahlström, 2010), but there was an additional fascinating feature of the UK state’s response. 
This was to recall Parliament (which was in recess) for an exceptional day’s debate on the 11th of 
August. We analyse this using Speech Act Theory to detail discursive practices that MPs used 
whilst working on behalf of the state. These helped to restore a sense of what civic space meant 
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and also a sense of order. This emphasis on practices accords with the interests of Deleuze & 
Guattari (1983) and Soja (1996) who recognise these as key to order. 
Understanding the “performative” state: the role of Speech Act Theory  
Speech Act Theory originates in the work of the philosopher Austin (1955), further discussed by 
Searle (1969, 1973, 1976). Austin’s work mainly comes to us posthumously, through notes of his 
lectures. Consequently there is debate (outside of our scope) as to whether Searle offers 
genuinely new insights into Speech Act Theory, or is essentially a torchbearer (Rajagopalan, 
2000). The central argument in Austin’s framework is that utterances are “performative” 
(Gregson & Rose, 2000; Miller, 2000). Words do not just relay content, describe, or state things, 
they actually “do” things. Furthermore, the way they do things is not through semantic content, it 
is by being uttered in particular settings with a certain intent: hence speech “act”.  
Paradigmatic examples Austin gave include, “I do” (in the context of a marriage ceremony), “I 
bet you” (waging a sum of money), “I bequeath” (leaving something in a will). Such linguistic 
acts often have force because they are associated with ritual, ceremony or convention (Miller, 
2000), and depend in some way on a shared set of understandings about what happens in 
institutional settings, whether (in these examples) the church, betting shop or lawyer’s office. But 
- importantly in Speech Act Theory - all utterances signify and enact simultaneously (Gregson & 
Rose, 2000). Speech Act Theory offers a way to operationalize the fundamental insight of 
interpretive discourse analysis. This is that language, comprising both individual utterances as 
well as broader bodies of discourse, has constitutive effects on its context (Heracleous & 
Marshak, 2004). This is consistent with a number of antecedents in social theory (Heracleous, 
2006). Actors make use of linguistic resources in an intentional, performative manner, and 
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simultaneously exist and operate within established understandings typified by language 
(Heracleous & Barrett, 2001).  
Austin differentiates between three aspects of talk as performance: the locutionary dimension, 
the illocutionary act, and the perlocutionary effects. The locutionary dimension is: “words 
thought of as sounds, as elements of a vocabulary and as syntactically ordered sequences... sense 
and reference”; the illocutionary act is what is, “conventionally done in producing a sentence; the 
act of asserting or commanding or questioning”; the perlocutionary effects are, “produced by 
performing an illocutionary act” (Miller, 2000: 156). Austin himself had problems distinguishing 
between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary (Horn, 2005) and later variants of Speech Act 
Theory (Searle, 1969, 1973) expanded on or challenged these categories. Here we employ these 
categories to differentiate between (i) the content of what was said, (ii) what it achieved in situ, 
in the House of Commons, and (iii) its effects in terms of the production of order.  
Speech Act Theory is useful because parliamentary talk is filled with performative protocols: “I 
give way to the Honourable Lady”; “I thank the Honourable Gentleman”; “I join the Prime 
Minister in paying tribute”; “I will take up the member’s invitation”; “I commend the Prime 
Minister for his decision”; “I want to put on record”; “I condemn”, etc. All these both signify and 
enact. Beyond semantic content and the utterance (the locutionary dimension), they express 
positions such as support, solidarity, difference, or simply being there (the illocutionary act). 
Perlocutionary effects extend beyond the chamber to how other parties hear, see or interpret 
these words.  
Despite the initial focus of Speech Act Theory on single, decontextualized instances of 
performative speech, the approach has been extended and employed within broader discourse 
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analytic frameworks as a way to analyse the effects of particular discursive choices on their 
context. For example, Heracleous & Marshak (2004) employed Speech Act Theory as the action-
oriented aspect of an integrative discourse analysis approach. They analyzed the trajectory of 
speech acts within a senior team meeting regarding choices in organisation design, particularly 
the illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions, to shed light on a strategic decision and the role 
of speech acts in reaching that decision. Further, Guild (2002) employed Speech Act Theory 
within a discursive analytical approach in the context of an employee layoff process at a ski 
resort. The study revealed the relative importance of different stakeholders to management as 
apparent via management’s illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts, which were shown to 
be in contrast to stated organizational values. Ford & Ford (1995), going against the dominant 
idea that communication processes occur within processes of change, argued that change is 
instead constituted by intentional, performative communicative acts. Particular types of 
utterances, given their performative nature, accomplish certain effects, which then collectively 
constitute organizational change. Subsequent studies found extensive use of speech acts in the 
context of change processes (e.g. Palmer, King & Kelleher, 2004).  Finally, critical studies have 
examined how particular speech acts can legitimate and perpetuate employment discourses that 
marginalize women in particular industries (e.g. Stobbe, 2005); and ethical studies how a 
performative conception of oaths could promote more responsible behaviour in business by 
committing and motivating agents to continuously upholding their promise (Blok, 2013). Speech 
Act Theory has therefore been employed beyond a focus on the single utterance and often in 
conjunction with a discursive approach, to shed light on larger scale events (Pratt, 1970).   
Foreshadowing our findings, by analysing parliamentary debate in terms of Speech Act Theory, 
we give examples of locutionary content describing the riots. We show that these had 
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illocutionary effects: to display consensus, assert control, and to frame events as requiring urgent 
response and corrective action. Finally, the intended perlocutionary effects were to produce 
order. This was done through: homogenizing and normalizing; unifying state level actors (MPs) 
with the response at street level; and galvanizing operations in the aftermath of the “riots” - 
including the mobilization of legal processes and institutions. 
In what follows, we analyse MPs’ contributions in the debate, drawing on interview data for 
triangulation. We identify and analyse four themes from the debate: “disorder”, “riot”, “gangs”, 
and “copycats”. From a critical discourse analysis perspective (Fairclough, 1992, 2005), these 
are central discursive constructions of the kind that manifest in language, written and oral texts, 
and shape social practices. They in turn operate within, as well as constitute, broader grand 
discourses of statehood and proper citizenship, deviation from which justifies and necessitates 
robust state response. As our analysis shows, Speech Act Theory allows us to trace the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of these themes, informed by their connotations in 
context, and to note the implications of this analysis for the production of order.  
Urban disorder and the “performative” production of order 
“Disorder” 
The term “order” has a number of connotations in the House of Commons, usually concerning 
the terms under which debate can be conducted, or whether practices are in keeping with 
established protocols and tradition. In the debate, there was a high degree of cross-party 
consensus, with none of the oppositional jeering and cheering associated with emblematic events 
such as Prime Ministers Questions, and only mild points of friction relating to contemporary 
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policy on cuts in policing. MPs from very different parts of the political spectrum signalled this 
in summing up the events of the day; “I am proud today of the way in which Parliament has 
conducted this debate” (Ms Blears, who was considered to be on the left of the Labour party), 
“The contributions made by honourable Friends and other honourable Members have made me 
proud to be a Member of Parliament” (Mr Gove, considered to be on the right of the 
Conservative party). 
Overall, the day’s debate on disorder was conducted in an extremely orderly fashion. One 
exception came after a slightly surreal exchange between a Labour MP, Robert Flello, and the 
Prime Minister. Mr Flello asked a question without wearing a jacket, which it is customary for 
male members to wear in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister began his reply: 
I do not know whether we need an inquiry into safety in the House, Mr Speaker, but 
someone seems to have stolen the honourable Gentleman’s jacket. 
The Speaker replied: 
I assure the House that nothing disorderly has happened. The honourable Member for 
Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) was perfectly in order. He was focusing not on 
sartorial matters but on violence, and he was perfectly in order. We will leave it at that. I 
ask the House to try to rise to the level of events. 
This sense of what order was “in the House” and references to violence and stealing jarred with 
recent events. Officers we interviewed recalled chaos in street-level struggles over territory: 
[I was] keeping this crowd back so that London Ambulance Service and London Fire 
Brigade can do their job. Save life, that’s got to be more important than anything else 
that’s going on at the moment  
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[a colleague] managed to keep the whole high street free of any looters just by using the 
show of force [a police tactic involving raising batons and charging in a line] 
The most visibly shocking aspects to the disorder had come about because civic space had been 
transformed - fires replaced artificial light, roads were barricaded, shops looted and public spaces 
became out of bounds. These radical inversions suggest disorder can be understood in terms of 
Bakhtin’s carnival - rapid reconfiguring of power relations, displacement of authority and a 
space for new voices to be heard (Belova, King & Sliwa, 2008). Consistent with other 
commentators (Spalek, Isakjee & Davies, 2012), one select committee witness identified this: 
Clapham Junction [was] like a carnival atmosphere. It was a party atmosphere—a very, 
very hyped up, intense celebration that, “We can do this and we can get away with it. 
Look, the police are 50 yards away and they’re just watching.” (Reverend Perkin, in 
Britain, 2012b: 60). 
Carnival is not necessarily emancipatory (Žižek, 2007), and disorder, even if it challenges one 
mode of domination, need not mean improvement. A move away from the state’s representation 
of space could offer no more than a glimpse of the abyss, as Dodd & Davies’ (2011, no page) 
account of a barricade at Hackney’s Pembury Estate showed: 
masked youths – both men and women – helped carry debris, bins, sticks and motorbikes, 
laying them across the roads to form a flaming boundary to the estate. 
This image, of a flaming boundary at one of the focal points of the disorder, highlights interplay 
between representations of space (the civic boundary of the estate, the roads), representational 
spaces (the local, cultural significance of that boundary) and spatial practice (burning debris, 
lines of people in masks, the barricade). These totems of “disorderly” spatial practices in August 
2011 involved appropriation of state space and territorial claims. At the same time as being 
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representational (lived) space some were attempts to impose new representations of space and to 
subvert or parodise state representations of space (Traugott, 1995). 
“Riot” 
Speech acts are historically highly significant in response to street-level disorder. The reading of 
the Riot Act gave unprecedented powers to those empowered by the state to put down 
disturbances, in the form of indemnity from prosecution (which in one instance led to the 
Peterloo Massacre). “Riot” continues to have a specific legal definition, and implications. One 
officer we interviewed set these out for us in relation to the 2011 “riots”: 
There was no common purpose for me, which is technically why you could say it’s not a 
riot, because for a riot to happen under the Public Order Act, everyone has to have a 
common purpose. But for a disorder, it can be violence or threats of violence but they 
don’t have to have a common purpose... If a riot happens the police are liable for any 
damages... the cynic could say that’s why it was called a disorder and not a riot but if you 
look at the facts then it actually wasn’t a riot. 
In debate, sensitive to the context for his speech, Malcolm Wicks, MP for Croydon North, 
emphasized, “As soon as I heard that there were riots—and they were riots” (Croydon was the 
scene of iconic footage of arson as a local landmark – a furniture store - burned down). The 
Prime Minister’s opening statement asserted, “I confirm that any individual, home owner or 
business that has suffered damage to or loss of their buildings or property as a result of rioting 
can seek compensation under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886, even if uninsured”. Interestingly, 
even though the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) processed thousands of claims for 
compensation, their report 4 Days in August (MPS, 2012) only uses “riot” or “rioter” in reported 
speech whereas it cites (over 500 times) “disorder”, or “disorders”.  
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The offence of “riot” is also significant because it is potentially associated with increased 
severity of sentencing. MPs showed consensus with reference to the role of the judiciary, for 
instance Opposition Leader Ed Miliband’s asked the Prime Minister to “agree” that: 
magistrates and judges need to have those circumstances at the front of their mind so that 
those found guilty of such disgraceful behaviour receive the tough sentences that they 
deserve and the public expect? 
Even though there was this consensus on calling the circumstances “riots”, there was a lack of 
clarity about whether the “riots” had common purpose and whether they were “disorder” (one 
incident), or “disorders” (multiple incidents). Many MPs cast the participants in disorder as 
mindless: “thugs”, “hooligans” (Mr Cameron, PM) “thugs and hooligans” (Mr Metcalfe), 
“thugs” (Ms May), “mindless violence and thuggery” (Mr Cameron, PM), perpetrators of 
“mindless violence” (Mr Pawsey). But others suggested the rioters were co-ordinated: 
“opportunistic looting” (Ms Cooper), “deliberate, organised, violent criminality” (Ms Blears), 
“copycat criminals” (Mr Binley), “organised criminality” (Mr Lloyd & Mr Barwell). 
Occasionally MPs invoked categories that were still, on each occasion of use, unitary and 
exhaustive (i.e. they grouped all participants together), but that also seemed to describe different 
phenomena: 
a new class of criminal consumer: BlackBerry-enabled, self-organised groups, whose 
new-found collectivism had diminished their fear of the police and increased their 
contempt for the law (Mr Watson). 
mindless idiots and career criminals who take pleasure in causing trouble and who 
thought that this was a golden opportunity to rob and steal and not get caught (Mr Leech). 
These tensions between themes of mindlessness, organization, individualism and co-ordination 
indicate (as later research found), that the power, interests, affiliations and “careers” of those 
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participating varied. To restore order quickly during crisis, and to reassert the sense of returning 
to normality, it is preferable to be able to point to one cause, one event, one category of threat. 
This homogenization means disruption can be compartmentalized or bracketed and it can also be 
identifiably described as finished. But the scale, diversity and duration of the disorder(s), as well 
as the aftermath presented a challenge because it was not straightforward to ascribe such neat 
categories to the events. Even if the semantic content of what MPs said was incoherent, they 
consistently echoed each other’s sentiments and displayed a cross-party consensus about the 
framing of events. Speech Act Theory helps call attention to how, over and above description, 
MPs’ utterances were “doing” something. In the wake of street-level crises of territoriality and 
sovereignty, the debate showed state actors producing order. 
The clearest way in which MPs and police were linked through speech acts was in MPs paying 
tribute to the service by police officers at the frontline. “Let me take this opportunity to pay 
tribute to the Welsh police forces” (Mr Lwyd); “In relation to Birmingham and the West 
Midlands, may I add my tribute to the work of the police (Mr Burden)”; “May I voice my 
support for the police, including the brave officers who faced unprecedented violence and 
criminality in Manchester” (Mr Goggins); “May I pay my tribute to the West Midlands police” 
(Ms Steward); “Will the Prime Minister pay tribute to police forces from outside London, such 
as Bedfordshire (Mr Selous)”; “I congratulate Thames Valley police” (Dr Lee). At the 
locutionary level (semantic content) these assertions seem to be local - because MPs mention 
their constituencies. However, at the illocutionary level (as performance), recurring references to 
the work of the police had two functions which showed MPs working at the level of the state. 
First, this signaled the apparatus of the state standing as a whole against “the” riots, and second it 
was a way for parliament to associate itself with corrective action at street level. Combined with 
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cross-party consensus about the framing of events, for instance in terms of gangs (as discussed in 
the next section), the perlocutionary effect of the debate was to show Parliament acting as the 
guardian of order. The aim was to restore a common sense of civic space, and in doing so to 
bracket disruptive spatial practices. This meant collectively casting those responsible for such 
practices as Other. This was clearest in citations to “gangs”. 
“Gangs” 
In his opening statement, the Prime Minister asserted Mark Duggan’s death was “used as an 
excuse by opportunist thugs in gangs, first in Tottenham itself, then across London and in other 
cities”. The Prime Minister also offered a very specific definition of “gang”: 
Territorial, hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young boys, 
mainly from dysfunctional homes. They earn money through crime, particularly drugs, 
and are bound together by an imposed loyalty to an authoritarian gang leader. They have 
blighted life on their estates, with gang-on-gang murders and unprovoked attacks on 
innocent bystanders. 
There were 99 citations of “gang(s)” in the day’s debate, these also included references to “gang 
culture”. “Gang” and “gang culture” were used interchangeably - for instance the Prime Minister 
said (prefacing the above definition), “At the heart of all the violence sits the issue of the street 
gangs” then shortly after, “I have asked the Home Secretary to work with the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions and other Cabinet colleagues on a cross-government programme of 
action to deal with this gang culture”. The Home Secretary, Teresa May, undertook, “I will bring 
a report on gang culture and the number of gangs in our society... to the House in October”. In 
response to the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader Ed Miliband stated: 
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We need a sustained effort to tackle the gangs in our cities—something we knew about 
before these riots. In the consideration that the Prime Minister gives to how we tackle 
gang culture, will he look urgently at the Youth Justice Board report published last June, 
which had a series of recommendations about what the Government should be doing to 
tackle gang culture?  
Equivocation of “gang” and “gang culture”, and the way “gangs” was used as an exhaustive 
category, smoothed over important sources of heterogeneity. Cavanagh & Dennis (2012) argue 
that political and media discourses relating to the 2011 riots, were framed as “pure criminality” 
and “mob rule”, in contrast to discussion of earlier riots in British history - where there was more 
of a political focus on “social problems”, “leaders”, or “infiltrators”. The “gangs” tag shifted 
emphasis away from deeper seated, sociological phenomena often associated with large scale 
disorder, such as poverty and policy, or a host of issues relating to race (Bennett, 2013). Such 
homogenising, discursive consolidation has been evident in other instances where the state 
regulates gangs and their urban spaces (Alonso, 2003). As speech acts, citations to “gangs” were 
not simply locutionary description of groups. Instead they showed state actors producing space, 
in ways that served to homogenize and normalise - placing those participating in disorder into a 
pre-existing, unitary category. This category was unproblematic, in the sense it included those 
already beyond the bounds of society. The illocutionary act was a kind of “tidying” - sweeping 
together a heterogeneous plurality of actors and interests. This placed them collectively outside 
the polity, and that cued appropriate response: action by state representatives at the level of 
territory to restore order, and a trailing of future changes to representations of space, “a report on 
gang culture and the number of gangs”, and, “a cross-government programme of action”. 
Homogenization had its parallel in one feature of gang activity, which was the renegotiation of 
representational spaces: 
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Gangs behaved in an entirely atypical manner for the duration of the riots, temporarily 
suspending hostilities with their postcode rivals. The effective four-day truce applied to 
towns and cities across England (Lewis, 2011: 4). 
In disorder, the state’s representation of space, can often be appropriated and take on new 
meanings as representational spaces. For some gangs, postcodes allot territory and identity, and 
(unlike their use by the state to homogenize space) they cement differences. During the disorder, 
these boundaries were dissolved because the scope for criminality became more ambitious: it 
became a grander-scale project relating to what was possible while the police were stretched. 
This involved revising established ideas of what civic space meant. 
Evidence of suspension of hostilities supports the Prime Minister’s statement about opportunism, 
but we know from subsequent large-scale qualitative research that the extent of gang 
involvement was “significantly overstated” (Lewis, Newburn et al, 2011: 4). Though we would 
stop short of generalizing from our interviews, and though we asked about this, officers did not 
tend to mention gangs, but conceivably could have been describing gang culture: 
(in London) once it got round to 5am a lot of the crowd had gone, but they’d gone to, you 
know, the retail park, some of them, and had worked out “Actually these places are 
virtually police free or there’s very few of them around”, and that’s when it, to me, just 
switched to acquisitive crime... Took on a different dynamic altogether after that, and 
everything else that followed, Enfield Sunday night and elsewhere, later Croydon, that 
was purely about anarchy as a prelude to looting. 
(in the West Midlands) young kids, disengaged with school... fourteen to eighteen year 
old youths who’re in training shoes and tracksuits... damaging the shops... stealing the 
property 
(in Leicester) kids mainly running around on their bikes, balaclavas on, smashing 
window, shops, and then it progressed into them into looting shops and throwing bricks, 
bottles at police... it was predominantly teenagers, kids on bikes who had decided to copy 
what they’d seen 
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(an officer who policed Salford) it was hatred of the system [rather than gangs] 
“Copycats” 
A signal and distinctive feature of the disorder was the use of instant messaging technology. MP 
Malcolm Wicks referred to how, “the thugs were more mobile, certainly more numerous and 
made more effective use of technology than the police”. One officer who had joined the police 
force in 2010 and was involved in frontline policing during 2011 told us, “I know people were 
surprised at how quickly it spread around London and copycatted into Birmingham and up 
North”. Keith, an experienced public order trainer described the disorder, “in terms of how it 
manifested itself that was unique... in terms of how it was driven with the social media”. 
Paul Lewis, journalist for The Guardian and also a researcher on a large scale study, Reading the 
Riots, described this as, “contagion” (Britain, 2012b: 95). This was consistent with Select 
Committee testimony: 
We were not expecting that level and spread, that replication, that copycatting of sheer 
criminality (Tim Godwin Acting Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, in Britain, 2012b: 
21). 
Everyone was copycatting Tottenham (Nathan Chin, former gang member, in Britain, 
2012b: 108). 
These disorders have been described as the social networking disorders... the so-called 
BlackBerry riots or the Twitter riots or the Facebook riots (Keith Vaz MP, Committee 
Chair, in Britain, 2012b: 81). 
The “copycatting” of looting and instances of arson such as the Pembury Estate barricade 
illustrate how disorder can be characterised by “repertoires of contention” (Tilly, 2003: 45). 
Repertoires of contention are shared social scripts for action, templates that offer choices in a 
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collective performance or resistance to authority, “learned cultural creations [that] emerge from 
struggle” (Tilly, 1995: 26). However, whilst instant messaging is an extremely contemporary 
repertoire that shrinks space, repertoires such as looting and arson are rooted in physical space 
(Brey, 1998). They create dramatic representational spaces but limit scope to enact change 
because they offer little prospect of developing into alternative ways of pressing claims. 
Contemporaneous commentary suggested much of the copycat activity was consumerist. The 
Prime Minister’s statement asserted this emphatically: 
The whole country has been shocked by the most appalling scenes of people looting, 
violence, vandalising and thieving. It is criminality, pure and simple—and there is 
absolutely no excuse for it... Young people stealing flat-screen televisions and burning 
shops—that was not about politics or protest, it was about theft. 
This was echoed by many other MPs: “criminality, pure and simple” (Tom Brake); “Whereas in 
years gone by rioters shouted ‘Church and King’, they now shout for ‘Adidas and Nike’.” (David 
Burrowes); “no real reason lies behind the current riots, apart from criminality” (Tony Lloyd). 
The copycat attribution homogenizes participants in disorder, as a result it supports consolidation 
or tidying. However, it potentially underplays one aspect of the disorder, which was the 
temporary shift for some to a new kind of public space, where authority was displaced and where 
seemingly “anything goes”. For “career criminals” or those looting “pure and simple”, perhaps 
deeper aspects to order in their everyday lives (consumption or the value of brands) were not 
displaced. For others, Select Committee testimony (above) suggested a carnivalesque atmosphere 
and so this was not “criminality, pure and simple”. This echoed sentiments expressed in our 
interviews with police officers. One front-line police officer asked about another phase of this 
research project - observation of training exercises, “did they let you have a go at being one of 
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the rioters? That’s fun”. Another described some people’s motivations for attacking police 
officers, “I think for a lot of people it’s just fun, if I’m being honest”. Commentators, Select 
Committee testimony and interviewees showed how mass disorder represented a shift in 
representational, lived space. This may have been accompanied by homogeneity in terms of 
spatial practices - as the label “copycat” signals, but this need not entail homogeneity of interests 
and motives nor common representational space. For example “looting” could be: opportunistic, 
organised, improvised, copycatting, calculating, reckless, carnival, delirium. 
Table 1 outlines the analysis in terms of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary 
dimensions, connotations of key themes, and implications in terms of production of order. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
       Table 1 about here 
   ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Implications for practice 
Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1955; Searle, 1969, 1973, 1976) has important implications for 
practice because it gives us a new way to explain how state actors influence society through the 
medium of discourse. Here we have shown the effects of speech acts in MPs seeking to restore 
order in great detail, but there are wider implications than this. The way in which powerful state 
actors “bracket”, “tidy” or “homogenize” complex events has implications for how society as a 
whole responds to complex challenges. To produce order in this setting, MPs expressed 
consensus over unitary categories. These flattened differences and allowed transgressive spatial 
practices to be bracketed, thereby working to restore order. This consolidation was supported by 
established practices, well rehearsed, institutionalized routines that helped the state: display 
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consensus; sweep together heterogeneous elements into an exhaustive category; and coordinate 
different levels of response, by enabling MPs to align themselves with street-level practices.  
These kinds of processes may oversimplify (as we suggest here), but then another implication is 
that they can also hold out the promise of clarity and focus – or strategic direction. In relation to 
the Covid-19 crisis for example, a lack of clarity of messaging has proven deeply problematic in 
many different jurisdictions. Greater ‘rule clarity’ has been shown to be associated  with higher 
levels of compliance with measures put in place to combat the spread of Covid-19 (Kooistra et 
al. 2020), yet there has been a failure to align the response at different levels of analysis in many 
jurisdictions, including within the UK (Kyprianides et al. 2020; Reicher 2020). What we show 
here, however, is that during an earlier crisis the UK state benefited from a skilled and practiced 
coordination between street- and state-levels. Such coordination is plainly possible, which makes 
its relative absence during the Covid-19 crisis all the more striking. 
Another implication of our account of speech acts, and of our analysis of this case, is that 
institutions can improve messaging if they have a better understanding of how certain 
mechanisms serve to amplify the performative effects of discourse. We have explained how, in 
the wake of a crisis, the UK parliament offered state representatives a platform, through the 
mechanism of an exceptional day’s debate, amplifying the performative aspects to their 
contributions. Analogous mechanisms may be helpful when considering the state’s response to 
other kinds of crisis - whether these are natural disasters or slower burning grand challenges such 
as Climate Change. 
Rather than offering an otherwise empty ‘talking shop’, such events may have important 
signalling and coordinating roles, serving to make clear to the public both what the crisis is and 
 25 
 
what is the appropriate response to it. McAdams (2017) argues that the codification of laws has 
an effect on people’s behaviour that goes beyond deterrence and the power of legitimate 
authority because law(s) provide focal points around which action can be coordinated. Making 
something illegal (or a legal requirement) both sends an important signal that the behaviour is 
considered morally wrong (or right) and provides a point of reference and regularity around 
which desired forms of behaviour can cohere. To return to the example of Covid-19, UK-based 
research has demonstrated a very strong correlation between the ‘expressive power’ of the laws 
put in place and public compliance with them (Jackson et al. 2020). Debates such as the one 
described here could have a similar effect, serving to cohere discourse around a set of ideas that 
also provide focal points for action. 
Our analysis identifies the need for two levels of spatial production that confront states dealing 
with large-scale social crises. The first is the atypical and complex demands it places on those 
who are responding at street-level. The second is that such crises necessitate a state-level 
response that is concerned with restoring a sense of normality, and thereby producing order in 
real time. Another implication here is that what constitutes the most effective overall response by 
the state, in terms of restoring order, is likely to depend on the timing and co-ordination of 
responses at these two different levels. Concomitantly, the strongest challenges to order will not 
just be expressed in practices at the level of territorial struggle, nor attack representations of 
space, they will also propose new kinds of representational space. To do so they will need to 
frustrate attempts at state tidying - discursive consolidation through speech acts that promote 
normalisation and homogenization. Theorists of civic order have typically seen these forces as 
the product of history or gradual colonization. This case of the 2011 riots shows that these forces 
also play a role in the production of order, as the state works in real time to smooth over crisis. 
 26 
 
Considering crisis is instructive to understanding the relationship between the state and order 
because it shows the state working on the production of order rapidly, rather than over successive 
generations and through the forces of history (Lefebvre, 1991). 
Discussion and conclusion 
A necessary, intended perlocutionary effect of the state response was to restore order by what we 
call tidying: collectively gathering deviance under one banner that is Other. This Othering was 
simplistic though, and the idea these were not “riots, pure and simple” (see Hope, 2012), is worth 
reflecting on. One consideration here is the underlying sense and reference of disorderly spatial 
practices. Some individual and collective acts during August were flagrantly “disorder”, in part 
because they displaced representations of space and violated established boundaries. Individual-
level examples were arson, smashing windows, burglary. Group-level examples included 
barricades and organized looting. The frequent catalyst for these was a widespread, if transient, 
perception that police were powerless, and this reflected deep changes in how authority and the 
everyday were perceived by the public - not simply those involved in disorder. The state’s grip 
on order seemed more tenuous than previously believed. However, and running contrary to the 
state’s logic of consolidation and tidying of rioters, there were various aspects of heterogeneity 
to the riots that may have made them less threatening than smaller scale, organized resistance. 
One aspect to this was the complex role of race. 
Murji & Neal (2011) argue the riots were both racialised and not racialised. On the one hand, at 
inception, events were racialized as they involved African-Caribbean communities, but on the 
other hand, events over the four days were not. Deracialisation was visible in terms of the diverse 
ethnic composition of the rioters and residents, in the geographically widespread nature of 
 27 
 
subsequent looting and disorder, and the seemingly incongruous character of rioting in nearby 
“unracialised” areas, like Enfield (Murji & Neal, 2011). This differed from previous riots, where 
boundaries, practices, ethnicity and discourse aligned more sharply. For instance, Burgess (1985) 
showed the media’s discursive representation of race in the riots of the 1980s. This designated 
particular urban spaces as sites of deviance that lay outside broader societal values and norms. 
Such constructions are continually negotiated and transformed; mobilised both by “outside” 
actors (e.g. the Police) and communities in these areas (see Keith, 1993). 
There is a risk of neglecting race in analysis of the 2011 riots, as this could disguise continuing 
stigmatisation (Brown, 2011). This may mean that we substitute, rather than abolish categories 
that can have performative effects, i.e. where citations to a category are constitutive, producing 
and regulating certain kinds of subject (Butler, 1993). Speech Act Theory shows how non-racial 
discourse can become racially performative because of separation between the locutionary act 
and its effects. For instance, even though it is contrary to evidence, the term “gangs” is 
historically associated with black, minority ethnic and immigrant young men. And, groups of 
black males are associated with gang activity and with violence and drug dealing and abuse by 
white populations (Alexander, 2008). These processes have been spatialized because many urban 
areas of deprivation have higher concentrations of minority ethnic groups (Amin, 2012). Spatial 
concentration makes these groups more visible to the state, and the use of public spaces by 
young people as territorialised communal sites, can be discursively framed as sites of “gang 
culture”, deviance and criminality (Back, 1996). Alexander (2008) argues that conflating race, 
immigrant groups, and gangs frames them as against national unity and interests, accelerating 
processes of regulation and surveillance. More broadly still, there is discursive framing of 
minority ethnic groups and public disorder and crime (e.g. muggings) within urban areas by the 
 28 
 
media, politicians, and the state (Keith, 2005). Since spatiality, and racial and gang discourses 
are intricately interwoven, prejudices can translate into state control and discipline (Anderson 
1990). Racial political discourses have been deployed to re-territorialise, by supporting the case 
for greater regulatory powers and conferring legitimacy to the state’s attempts to recapture such 
spaces (Beckett & Herbert, 2010). 
Lefebvre (1991: 54) suggests, “revolution that does not produce a new space... has failed in that 
it has not changed life itself.” We are not comparing the events of August to revolution by any 
means, but Lefebvre’s description is relevant in considering why this large-scale disorder did not 
materialize into greater change. One explanation for why these events were transient may be that 
there was no single “Other”, and instead there was heterogeneity among those participating. 
Moreover, many, but not all, of these seemed to share an inscribed social script equating success 
or happiness with possessions, which is the formula that underpins contemporary consumption. 
In this sense, the “riots” may have left representational space, and an underlying order, 
untouched. There may indeed have been the homogeneity MPs sought for to normalise and 
restore order, but rather than this being because “rioters” were collectively and en masse outside 
the polity, it may be because the majority embraced deeply conventional, consumerist values.  
Another way to express this is in terms of the difference between representations of space and 
representational spaces. Representations of space by the state make space a place for exchange, 
where representational spaces turn space into something that can be used (Fernandes, 2007). 
Representational space is lived, or in use as a consequence of social action and discourse; it is, 
“alive: it speaks” (Lefebvre, 1991: 42). It is space that is taken and used, expropriated from the 
state and market, and inhabited differently, thereby disrupting homogeneity (Harvey, 2012). The 
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“riots” may not have expropriated from the market, but simply represented an alternative, 
ephemeral marketplace for some, with consumption facilitated by violence rather than capital. 
This may have been combined with a resigned understanding that carnival is fleeting and that 
return to state order was inevitable.  
The commitment to consumption was clearly not the motive for all, in particular the origins of 
the “riots” and the march from the Broadwater Farm estate to Tottenham police station were very 
different phenomena with very different motives and interests. Disorder can often take the form 
of assertions of rights by the disenfranchised or a political organization in public space. This is 
where, “on street corners or in parks, in the streets during riots and demonstrations - political 
organizations can represent themselves to a larger population and through this representation 
give their cries and demands some force” (Mitchell, 2001: 129). Such spatial practices subvert 
representations of space and bring into being a very different kind of representational space. 
During disorder, any of a number of spatial practices can transform how space is routinely 
experienced. Indeed that is sometimes their purpose, for instance in the “reclaiming the streets” 
and “occupy” movements (Brown, 2004). However, looting and the barricade offer limited scope 
to press claims. In contrast, the suspension of markers of territory, identity and affiliation; and 
the possibility of remote co-ordination through closed information networks were very different 
repertoires of contention, and these could prefigure or channel social change (Tilly, 1995). 
Connecting Lefebvre’s ideas of the production of space to Speech Act Theory offers a novel 
perspective on order and one that links the “triad” to specific actors. It allows us to join a 
conversation on the role of discourse in social change (Barrett, Thomas & Hocevar, 1995; Grant 
& Marshak, 2011; Oswick, Grant & Marshak, 2010), our contribution to this conversation being 
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to account more particularly for the role of speech acts. The contextualization of our analysis, in 
terms of constative talk from officers who were at street level, suggests they were preoccupied 
with the reassertion of sovereignty through territorial struggles. This was partly based on a logic 
of difference: that this experience was entirely exceptional and unprecedented. Our analysis of 
performative talk, from MPs working at state level, suggests they were primarily preoccupied 
with normalization and homogeneity: framing participants in disorder, en masse, as outside 
society - an act of consolidation or “tidying”. 
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Table 1. Speech act theory and production of order in the (2011) “riots” 
Locutionary 
dimension –
key themes 
Connotations of term 
(associated meanings 
based on context) 
Illocutionary dimension 
(intent) 
Perlocutionary 
dimension (effects) 
Implications re 
Production of Order 
Disorder “Order” as a privileged term 
in parliament, associated 
with reversing transgression; 
restoration of order is 
paramount 
To present events as 
something negative that 
needs to be corrected to revert 
things back to “order” 
Creation of cross-party 
consensus on what was 
occurring, on both the 
evaluative and action 
dimensions 
Transformations of civic 
space are inappropriate 
when they result from 
“disorder”, unauthorized by 
state 
Riot and the 
police 
response 
A stronger form of disorder, 
requiring a more robust 
response. Police initially 
avoiding term as it comes 
with compensation baggage 
Police praised as a means of 
uniting the state apparatus 
and associating parliament 
with corrective action at street 
level 
Unification of state 
apparatus to restore order. 
Comprehensive response at 
street level 
A sense of what civic space 
means should be restored so 
that order and the status quo 
is preserved 
Gangs  Criminal elements that have 
no other interest than 
perpetrating criminal acts, 
have opportunistically acted 
to amplify events 
Such elements are uniting 
against order and amplifying 
effects of riot; they need to be 
dealt with robustly 
Subsequent police 
operations to identify every 
single rioter and bring them 
to justice 
Elements of conceived space 
(postcode gangs) joined with 
spatial practices and lived 
space to cause disorder 
Copycats Inspired by similar events 
elsewhere to act mindlessly, 
copycats repeat and 
disseminate these events, 
causing an additive effect 
Indicate speed by which 
events were copied, assisted 
by social media technologies; 
challenging state’s capacity to 
match speed of response 
More resources employed to 
deal with additive effects of 
media technologies in aiding 
copycat actions; show that 
state can match up its own 
response 
Speed of copycat actions 
presents even greater threat 
to spatial status quo, 
requiring robust response to 
return to order 
 
 30 
 
References 
Agnew, J. (1994). ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory’ Review of International Political Economy 1(1) 53–80. 
Alexander, C. E. (2008). Rethinking ‘Gangs’: Gangs, Youth Violence and Public Policy. 
Runnymede Trust, London. 
Alonso, A. (2004). ‘Racialized Identitites and the Formation of Black Gangs in Los Angeles.’ 
Urban Geography, 25:7, 658-674. 
Alvord, S. H., Brown, L. D., & Letts, C. W. (2004). Social entrepreneurship and societal 
transformation: An exploratory study. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 40(3). 260-
282. 
Amin, A. (2012). Land of Strangers Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Anderson, E. (1990). Streetwise: Race, class and change in an urban community. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Austin, J. L. (1955). How to Do Things With Words Eds J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisa, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Back, L. (1996). New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racism and Multiculture in Young 
People’s Lives. UCL Press, London. 
Banerjee, S. B. (2003). ‘Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the 
Reinvention of Nature’ Organization Studies 24(1) 143–80. 
Barrett, F. J., Thomas, G. F., & Hocevar, S. P. (1995). The central role of discourse in large-scale 
change: A social construction perspective. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 31(3). 
352-372. 
 31 
 
Beckett, K. & Herbert, S. (2010). Banished: The New Social Control in Urban America. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Belova, O. King, I. & Sliwa, M. (2008). ‘Introduction: Polyphony and Organization Studies: 
Mikhail Bakhtin and Beyond’ Organization Studies 29(4) 493-500. 
Bennett, J. (2013) ‘Moralising class: A discourse analysis of the mainstream political response to 
Occupy and the August (2011) British riots’ Discourse and Society 24(1) 27-45. 
Blok, V. (2013). ‘The power of speech acts: Reflections on a performative concept of ethical 
oaths in economics and business’ Review of Political Economy 71(2) 187-208. 
Brey, P. (1998). ‘Space-Shaping Technologies and the Geographical Disembedding of Place’ 
Philosophy & Geography vol. III: Philosophies of Place. (Annual journal.) Eds A. Light & J. B. 
Smith, Rowman & Littlefield, London 239-263. 
Britain Great, (2012a). Policing large scale disorder: lessons from the disturbances of August 
(2011). sixteenth report of session (2010)-12, Vol 1: Report together with formal minutes (The 
Stationery Office, London) 
Britain Great, (2012b). Policing large scale disorder: lessons from the disturbances of August 
(2011). sixteenth report of session (2010)-12, Vol 2: Oral and written evidence (The Stationery 
Office, London) 
Britain Great, (2012c). Policing large scale disorder: lessons from the disturbances of August 
2011. the Government response to the sixteenth report of the Home Affairs Committee session 
2010-12 HC (1456) (The Stationery Office, London) 
Brown, R. (2011). Prejudice: Its social psychology Blackwell, Oxford. 
Brown, G. (2004). ‘Sites of public homo sex and the carnivalesque spaces of reclaim the streets’ 
in The Emancipatory City? Paradoxes and possibility Ed L. Lees Sage, London 91–107. 
 32 
 
Burgess, J. A. (1985). ‘News from nowhere: the press, the riots, and the myth of the inner city’, 
in Geography, the Media and Popular Culture Eds J. A. Burgess & J. R. Gold, Croom Helm, 
London: 192–228. 
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that Matter. On the discursive limits of ‘sex’ Routledge, London. 
Cabantous, L., Gond, J. P., Harding, N. & Learmonth, M. (2016). ‘Critical Essay: Reconsidering 
critical performativity’. Human Relations, 69(2) 197-213. 
Cavanagh, A. & Dennis, A. (2012). ‘Framing the riots’ Capital and Class 36(3) 375–381. 
Clegg, S. R. & Kornberger, M. Eds (2006). Space, Organization and Management Theory Liber 
and Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia University of 
Minnesota Press, Minnesota.  
Dodd, V. & Davies, C. (2011). ‘London riots escalate as police battle for control’ The Guardian, 
9 August. 
Easley, C. A. (2010). Expanding a conversation: Is how we live as a culturally diverse society 
congruent with our underlying assumptions, methodologies, and theories regarding change? The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 46(1) 55-72. 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Fairclough, N. (2005). ‘Discourse analysis in organization studies: The case for critical realism’ 
Organization Studies 26, 915-39.  
Fernandes, E. (2007). ‘Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil’ Social and Legal Studies 
XVI(2) 201-219. 
Ford, J, D, & Ford, L. W. (1995). ‘The role of conversations in producing intentional change in 
organizations’ Academy of Management Review 20, 541-570. 
 33 
 
Ghoshal, S. (2005). ‘Bad management theories are destroying good management practices’ 
Academy of Management Learning and Education 4(1) 75–91. 
Gottdiener, M. (2000). ‘Lefebvre and the bias of academic urbanism’ City: analysis of urban 
trends, culture, theory, policy, action 4(1) 93-100. 
Green, A. I., Follert, M., Osterlund, K. & Paquin, J. (2010). ‘Space, Place and Sexual Sociality: 
Towards an ‘Atmospheric Analysis’’ Gender, Work & Organization 17(1) 7–27. 
Gregson, N. & Rose, G. (2000). ‘Taking Butler elsewhere: performativities, spatialities and 
subjectivities’ Environment and Planning D 18(4) 433-452. 
The Guardian (2012) Reading the Riots: Investigating England’s Summer of Disorder, on 
http://wwwguardiancouk/uk/series/reading-the-riots. 
Guild, W. L. (2002). ‘Relative importance of stakeholders: analysing speech acts in a layoff’ 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 23(7) 837-52. 
Harvey, D. (1993). ‘From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of 
Postmodernity’, in Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change Eds J. Bird & B. Curtis 
Routledge, London 3–29. 
Harvey, D. (2012) Rebel cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution Verso, New 
York. 
Heracleous, L. (2006). Discourse, interpretation, organization Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Heracleous, L. & Marshak, R. (2004). ‘Conceptualizing organizational discourse as situated 
symbolic action’ Human Relations 57(10) 1285-1312. 
 34 
 
Heracleous, L. & Barrett, M. (2001). ‘Organizational change as discourse: Communicative 
actions and deep structures in the context of IT Implementation’ Academy of Management 
Journal 44(4) 755-778. 
Hope, T. (2012). ‘Riots, pure and simple?’ Criminal Justice Matters 87(1) 2-4. 
Horn, J. (2005). ‘Linguistic Acts’ in T Honderich (Ed) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 521-22. 
Jackson, J., Posch, C., Bradford, B., Hobson, Z., Kyprianides, A. and Yesberg, J. (2020). ‘The 
lockdown and social norms: Why the UK is complying by consent rather than compulsion’. 
British Politics and Policy at LSE. Available at: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104145/1/Jackson_the_lockdown_and_social_norms.pdf 
Keith, M. (1993). Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-racist Society UCL 
Press, London. 
Keith, M. (2005). ‘Racialization and the public spaces of the multicultural city’ in Racialization 
Eds Murji K, Solomos J, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kingma, S. F. (2008). ‘Dutch casino space or the spatial organization of entertainment’ Culture 
and Organization 14(1) 31-48. 
Kooistra, E.B., and Folmer, C.R., Kuiper, M.E., Olthuis, E. Brownlee, M., Adam, F. and van 
Rooij, B. (2020). ‘Mitigating COVID-19 in a Nationally Representative UK Sample: Personal 
Abilities and Obligation to Obey the Law Shape Compliance with Mitigation Measures’. 
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2020-19, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3598221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598221 
Kornberger, M. & Clegg, S. (2004). ‘Bringing space back in: Organizing the Generative 
Building’ Organization Studies 25(7) 1095–1114. 
 35 
 
Kyprianides, A. et al (2020) ‘Time to give LRFSs back some value’. TheMJ.co.uk. Available at: 
https://themj.co.uk/Time-to-give-LRFs-back-some-value/218025 
Learmonth M, Harding N, (2006). ‘Evidence-based management: the very idea’ Public 
Administration 84(2). 245–266. 
Learmonth, M., Harding, N., Gond, J. P. & Cabantous, L. (2016). Moving critical performativity 
forward. Human Relations., 69(2). 251-256. 
Lefebvre, H. (1976). The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production 
Trans. F Bryant St Martin’s Press, New York. 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space Trans. D Nicolson-Smith Blackwell, Oxford. 
Lefebvre, H. (2002a), Critique of Everyday Life: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday 
Volume I Trans. J Moore Verso, London. 
Lefebvre, H. (2002b), Critique of Everyday Life: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday 
Volume II Trans. J Moore Verso, London. 
Lefebvre, H. (2002c), Critique of Everyday Life: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday 
Volume III Trans. G Elliot Verso, London. 
Lefebvre, H. (2003). The Urban Revolution University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Lewis, P., Newburn, T., Taylor, M., Mcgillivray, C., Greenhill, A., Frayman, H. & Proctor R, 
(2011). Reading the riots: investigating England’s summer of disorder London: LSE and The 
Guardian. 
Linell, P. & Markova, I. (1993). ‘Acts in discourse: From monological speech acts to dialogical 
inter-acts’. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23(2) 173-195. 
Massey, M. (1994) Space, Place, and Gender University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Metropolitan Police Service, (2012). 4 Days in August Metropolitan Police, London. 
 36 
 
McAdams, R.H. (2017). The Expressive Powers of Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Miller, S. (2000). ‘Speech acts and conventions’ Language Sciences 22 155-66. 
Ministry of Justice (2012). Statistical bulletin on the public disorder of 6th to 9th August (2011)-
September (2012) update The Ministry of Justice, London. 
Mitchell, D. (2001). The Right to the City Guilford, New York. 
Morrell, K. (2012). ‘Evidence-Based Dialectics’ Organization 19(4) 461-79. 
Murji, K. & Neal, S. (2011). ‘Riot: Race and Politics in the 2011 Disorders’ Sociological 
Research Online 16(4). 24. 
Oswick, C., Grant, D., Marshak, R. J., & Wolfram Cox, J. (2010). Organizational discourse and 
change: Positions, perspectives, progress, and prospects. The Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science, 46(1). 8-15. 
Painter J, (2006). ‘Prosaic geographies of stateness’ Political Geography 25 752-774. 
Palmer, I., King, A. W. & Kelleher, D. (2004). ‘Listening to Jack: GE’s change conversations 
with shareholders’ Journal of Organizational Change Management 17(6) 593-614. 
Pratt, M. L. (1986). ‘Ideology and speech-act theory’ Poetics Today 7(1) 59-72. 
Rajagopalan K, (2000). ‘On Searle [on Austin] on language’ Language & Communication 20(4) 
347-391. 
Reicher, S. (2020). ‘The way Boris Johnson has eased lockdown sends all the wrong messages’. 
The Guardian 24th June 2020. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/24/boris-johnson-ease-lockdown-
england. 
 37 
 
Schwarz, G. M. (2020). ‘Initiating Change in a Changing Landscape: The Power of Applied 
Behavioral Science’, The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 56(1) 5–10. 
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language (Vol 626). Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Searle, J. R. (1973). ‘Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts’ In I Berlin Ed, Essays on J L 
Austin Clarendon Press, Oxford: 141-85. 
Searle, J. R. (1976). ‘A classification of illocutionary acts’ Language in society 5(1). 1-23. 
Sharma, G. and Good, D. (2013). The work of middle managers: Sensemaking and sensegiving 
for creating positive social change. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 49(1). 95-122. 
Soja, E. W. (1996) Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-imagined Places 
Wiley-Blackwell, London. 
Spalek, B., Isakjee, A. & Davies, T. (2012) ‘Panic on the streets of Birmingham? Struggles over 
space and belonging in the Revanchist City’ Criminal Justice Matters 87(1) 14-15. 
Tilly, C. (1995). ‘Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834’ in M Traugott (Ed) 
Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action Duke University Press, North Carolina: 15-42. 
Tilly, C. (2003). The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Traugott, M. (1995). ‘Barricades as Repertoire: Continuities and Discontinuities in the History of 
French Contention’ in M Traugott (Ed) Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action Duke 
University Press, North Carolina: 43-56. 
Tyler, M. & Cohen, L. (2010) ‘Spaces That Matter: Gender Performativity and Organizational 
Space’, Organization Studies 31(2) 175–98. 
 38 
 
Wahlström M, (2010). ‘Producing spaces for representation: racist marches, 
counterdemonstrations, and public-order policing’ Environment and planning D: society and 
space, 28(5) 811-827. 
Žižek S, (2007). ‘Divine Violence and Liberated Territories’ available on 
http://wwwsofttargetsjournalcom/web/zizekphp 
